Overview

In light of the events of September 11, 2001, there is an increased need to evaluate the possibility and impacts of a domestic terrorist attack with the primary objective of creating large-scale environmental damage (i.e., damages beyond the threat of immediate loss of life or injury to nearby human populations).  A number of challenges face homeland defense and security organizations in addressing this type of threat.

First, a broad range of target types is possible.  Obvious target types include hundreds or thousands of hazardous waste treatment facilities, chemical plants, pharmaceutical plants, oil refineries, manufacturing facilities, chemical and petroleum storage facilities, research laboratories, fossil and nuclear power plants, and transportation facilities.

Second, although the primary impacts of a small-scale, accidental environmental release are well understood, the primary effects to human health and the environment of large-scale, intentional releases are less understood. In addition, the secondary, longer-term effects in terms of contaminated groundwater, soil, and air as well as the socioeconomic impact of an environmental release are not well documented and quantified. The long-term consequences of a large-scale release could be very damaging to ecosystems and the local economy for a significant period of time.  Past experiences also have shown that many post-event remediation approaches pose substantial additional risks to the environment.

Third, no central information source is available on how to mitigate or defend against intentional environmental warfare.  The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board, and U.S. Department of Defense maintain the best information repositories on chemical stocks and have analyzed some consequences of accidental releases.  However, these repositories do not contemplate the threat from environmental terrorism and are not well organized to address this type of threat.  Environmental assurance tools and techniques are not widely known and available to homeland defense personnel.

Finally, current research on unforeseen environmental releases has focused on the outcomes of accidents.  This research often does not consider releases from fail-safe systems or from non-accidental events.  In the case of a terrorist attack or sabotage, these fail-safe systems may be the target of the attacker and, therefore, must be considered in a different light.  Intrinsically safe equipment is often not protected by redundant safety systems and may be more vulnerable to attack.

Some recent experiences are helpful in establishing a framework that can be applied to assessing environmental assurance issues.  For example, in preparation for Y2K, a number of States undertook efforts to strengthen the reliability and integrity of environmental subsystems for large industrial facilities threatened by Y2K failures.  The States were most concerned about a failure in a system leading to a large-scale environmental release.  A number of lessons were gained from these efforts, including the importance of identifying the most likely failures posing the greatest threat to human health and the environment.  This “triage” approach is particularly effective in prioritizing resources on mitigation and risk reduction strategies.  In addition, both accidental and purposeful releases of chemicals and hazardous materials provide insights into the magnitude and severity of different events.